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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent surge in maritime migration across the Mediterranean Sea has 
placed an unprecedented Search and Rescue (SAR) burden on merchant 
shipping.1  As human smugglers pack economic migrants and refugees by 
the hundreds onto unseaworthy vessels lacking the capacity to safely 
complete the treacherous sea crossings from North Africa and the Middle 
East to European shores, courageous commercial shipmasters and crews 
have regularly served as first responders to requests for assistance.2  While 
these acts of heroism have been lauded as compliant with entrenched moral 
and legal obligations, it is often overlooked that they have also come at great 
expense to shipping industry participants.3  
During the most taxing stretches from 2014 to the present, commercial 
vessels have been summoned to aid distressed migrants on a near daily 
basis.4  These rescues have often required perilous embarkation of hundreds 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See Mediterranean Migrant Crisis, INT’L CHAMBER OF SHIPPING, http://www.ics-ship 
ping.org/key-issues/all-key-issues-(full-list)/mediterranean-migrant-crisis (last visited Nov. 22, 
2017) [hereinafter Mediterranean Migrant Crisis].  Two thousand sixteen was the deadliest 
period of migrant drownings on record.  This trend of widespread fatalities continued in 2017.  
See 2016 Deadliest Year Ever for Migrants Crossing Mediterranean – UN Agency, U.N. NEWS 
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/01/548962-2016-deadliest-year-ever-migrants-
crossing-mediterranean-un-agency; Mediterranean Update, Migration Flows Europe: Arrivals 
and Fatalities Infographic, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.iom.int/inf 
ographics/mediterranean-update-migration-flows-europe-arrivals-and-fatalities-21-december-20 
16; Mediterranean Update, Migration Flows Europe: Arrivals and Fatalities Infographic, INT’L 
ORG. FOR MIGRATION (Nov. 14, 2017), https://relief web.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resour 
ces/171114_Mediterranean_Update.pdf [hereinafter IOM, Mediterranean Update].  
 2 Mediterranean Migrant Crisis, supra note 1.  
 3 Emma Diltz, Death and Desperation Taint Mediterranean Shipping Routes, POLITICO (May 
25, 2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/refugees-europe-migration-death-and-desperation-on-
mediterranean-shipping-routes/; Sara Sjolin, Shipping Industry Braces for Costs from Migrant 
Crisis, MARKET WATCH (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/shipp ing-industry-
braces-for-costs-from-migrant-crisis-2015-09-09; Jonathan Saul, In Mediterranean, Commercial 
Ships Scoop Up Desperate Human Cargo, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www. 
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/europe-migr ants-ship/; Terry Donaghy, Migrant Crisis 
Prompts Trade and Insurance Questions, LLOYD’S LIST (Aug. 30, 2015), https://lloydslist.mariti 
meintelligence.informa.com/LL018178/Migrant-crisis-prompts-trade-and-insurance-questions; 
Max Tingyao Lin, Latest Tragedy Shows Why Merchant Shipping Should Not Be Main Rescuer 
for Mediterranean Migrants, LLOYD’S LIST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligen 
ce.informa.com/LL016431/Latest-tragedy-shows-why-merchant-shipping-should-not-be-main-r 
escuer-for-Mediterranean-migrants; James Politi & Joel Lewin, Shipping Companies Warn of 
Migrant Rescue Risks, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/d8d0f67a-9bfe-
11e4-b6cc-00144feabdc0.  
 4 Mediterranean Migrants Crisis: Shipping Cannot Cope Alone, LLOYD’S LIST (Mar. 4, 
2015), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL016701/Mediterranean-migrant s-
crisis-shipping-cannot-cope-alone; Craig Eason, Migrants in the Med: Shipping Will Continue to 
Respond, but it Cannot Solve the Problem, LLOYD’S LIST (Sept. 4, 2015), https://lloydslist.mar 
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of people at a time, followed by navigational diversions and complex 
coordination with coastal authorities to determine an appropriate place of 
disembarkation.5  The direct and indirect costs arising out of these operations 
can be staggering.  Shipping interests have routinely reported losses running 
into the tens and even hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars.6  In response, 
industry stakeholders have repeatedly urged coastal states and supranational 
organizations to more effectively lead SAR functions, yet dependence on 
commercial resources persists.7  
International law is unequivocal that commercial shipmasters are obliged 
to render assistance to distressed vessels without any promise of 
compensation.8  Unfortunately, the language of popularly used shipping 
                                                                                                                   
itimeintelligence.informa.com/LL018103/Migrants-in-the-Med-shipping-will-continue-to-respo 
nd-but-it-cannot-solve-the-problem. 
 5 Mediterranean Migrants Crisis: Shipping Cannot Cope Alone, supra note 4; Eason, 
supra note 4.  As the mass arrival of migrants in Europe sparks political backlash, industry 
stakeholders have voiced concern that coastal states may change their policies and become 
less willing to allow disembarkation from merchant ships.  See Jane Mcintosh, Italy Threatens 
to Turn Away Foreign Ships with Rescued Migrants, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 28, 2017), 
http://www.dw.com/en/italy-threatens-to-turn-away-foreign-ships-with-rescued-migrants/a-3 
9462522. 
 6 See Liam Moloney & Costas Paris, Europe’s Cargo Ships Diverted to Sea Rescues, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boat-people-trying-to-reach-europe-disrupt-
mediterranean-mercantile-shipping-1427399702; Saul, supra note 3.   
 7 ICS Calls on UN to Act on Migrant Deaths, LLOYD’S LIST (Feb. 17, 2017), https://lloyds 
list.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL025618/ICS-calls-on-UN-to-act-on-migrant-deaths; 
Janet Porter, German Shipowners Call for Massive Expansion of Mediterranean Rescue Efforts, 
LLOYD’S LIST (Apr. 22, 2015), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL016401/G 
erman-shipowners-call-for-massive-expansion-of-Mediterranean-rescue-efforts; Craig Eason, 
Shipping Bodies Urge the International Community to Stop Boat Migrants, LLOYD’S LIST (Dec. 
18, 2014), https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL048926/Shipping-bodies-urge-t 
he-international-community-to-stop-boat-migrants.  Unsurprisingly, since commercial crews are 
generally untrained for large-scale humanitarian operations and are often substantially 
outnumbered by persons in need of assistance, there have been reports of psychological injuries 
arising out of these migrant rescues.  Some crews have reported shocking abuses by migrant 
smugglers, such as the dumping of women and children into the sea to lure passing ships to stop 
for assistance.  Others have reported having to barricade themselves inside their own vessel after 
embarking over 1,000 people.  See Fanny Carrier, ‘We Locked Ourselves In’ – A Captain’s 
Migrant Log, MODERN GHANA (May 31, 2017), https://www.modernghana.com/news/778773/w 
e-locked-ourselves-in-a-captains-migrant-log.html; Lizzie Dearden, Migrant Boat Crisis: Human 
Smugglers ‘Throwing Pregnant Women and Children Overboard to Drown to Force 
Commercial Ships to Rescue Them,’ INDEPENDENT (June 1, 2015), http://www.independent.co.u 
k/news/world/europe/migrant-boat-crisis-human-smugglers-throwing-pregnant-women-and-
children-overboard-to-drown-to-force-10290183.html; Craig Eason, Mediterranean Trafficking 
Gangs Dump Boat People Near Passing Ships, LLOYD’S LIST (Sept. 26, 2014), https://lloydslist. 
maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL047761/Mediterranean-trafficking-gangs-dump-boat-peop 
le-near-passing-ships.  
 8 See infra Section II.  
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contracts allocating who among the relevant shipping interests must absorb 
rescue costs is far less clear.9  For instance, the decades-old but ever-popular 
New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) 1946 time charterparty form produced 
by the Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO) remains in 
widespread commercial use in the dry-cargo trade,10 yet it is silent on 
relevant rescue-related liabilities.11  
This Article focuses on this contractual uncertainty of humanitarian 
rescue costs.  First, it outlines the legal obligations imposed on private 
shipmasters to render assistance to distressed vessels and discusses the 
related commercial consequences.12  Next, it examines the language of 
popularly used shipping contracts and evaluates deficiencies regarding 
rescue cost allocation, including an in-depth analysis of relevant court 
opinions and arbitration awards from both the United States and England.13  
Finally, drawing from the shipping industry’s experience in modifying 
contracts in response to pressing challenges, such as maritime piracy, it 
argues that new contract clauses should be developed and adopted to more 
precisely address rescue risk.14 
Note that for purposes of continuity in exploring contract language, this 
Article focuses on the language of NYPE time charterparty forms, in 
particular the NYPE 1946 form.15  The continued commercial importance of 
the NYPE 1946 form and the jurisprudence it has produced make discussion 
of its terms practically significant and may also expose problems arising 
under other widely used forms.16  For the sake of brevity and clarity, related 
issues connected to voyage charterparties, bills of lading, and other contracts 
of carriage are largely neglected.17 
                                                                                                                   
 9 See infra Sections II–III.  
 10 See Paul Todd, NYPE 2015: Wholesale Reform or an Invitation to Cherry-Pick?, 
LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 306, 306 (2016), https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/389633/2/Todd%252 
0NYPE%25202015%2520LMCLQ.pdf (discussing industry reluctance to adopt updated 
iterations of the NYPE forms designed to reflect modern commercial practices).  
 11 See infra Section III. 
 12 See infra Section II.  
 13 See infra Sections III.  
 14 See infra Sections IV–V.  
 15 See TERENCE COGHLIN ET AL., TIME CHARTERS 774–77 (7th ed. 2014), for a copy of the 
New York Produce Exchange Form 1946.  
 16 See id. at 1 (describing the NYPE 1946 form as “the most important standard form for 
dry cargo charters”); see also BIMCO, ASBA & SMF, NYPE 2015 Time Charter Party 
Explanatory Notes, SMF 1, 3, http://www.smf.com.sg/pdf/NYPE%202015%20Explanatory% 
20Notes.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2018) (“The 1946 edition is arguably still the most 
commonly used version of the NYPE charter. . . .”). 
 17 For an overview of related issues arising out of migrant rescues, see Kathleen S. 
Goddard, Rescuing Refugees and Migrants at Sea: Some Commercial Shipping Implications, 
21 INT’L J. MAR. L. 352 (2015).  
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 II.  THE LEGAL OBLIGATION TO RESCUE AND ITS IMPACT ON MERCHANT 
SHIPPING DURING PERIODS OF MASS MIGRATION AT SEA 
To fully appreciate the impact of maritime migration on the shipping 
industry, it is first important to examine the scope of the search and rescue 
obligations imposed on private shipmasters.  This section explores the 
principles arising under international law obliging shipmasters to render 
assistance to distressed vessels and coordinate with sovereign authorities to 
ensure rescued persons are delivered to a place of safety.  It then evaluates 
possible financial losses flowing from compliance with these obligations, 
setting the stage for examining allocation of rescue costs.  
A.  The Scope of the Shipmaster Obligation to Rescue at Sea 
The long-standing practice of seafarers assisting one another in distress 
situations is a maritime tradition with deeply-rooted humanitarian 
underpinnings.18  Over the centuries, through widespread recognition, this 
practice formed customary international law obliging shipmasters, including 
those operating vessels for commercial purposes, to altruistically perform 
rescues at sea without the expectation of compensation in return.19  
During the twentieth century, this customary norm was codified through 
international agreements, which today articulate the scope of this duty in 
more precise terms.  Following the tragic sinking of the Titanic, in which 
more than 1,500 civilian passengers perished, the international community 
responded by promulgating the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS 
Convention), which expressly recognizes the duty to rescue at sea.20  The 
SOLAS Convention has since been revised and amended, with the current 
iteration containing the following language: “[t]he master of a ship at sea 
which is in a position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving 
information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to 
proceed with all speed to their assistance. . . .”21  This shipmaster duty is 
                                                                                                                   
 18 See generally Steven F. Friedell, Compensation and Reward for Saving Life at Sea, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 1218 (1979).  
 19 Customary international law derives from “a general and consistent practice of states 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).  
 20 See Jeffrey Maltzman & Mona Ehrenreich, The Seafarer’s Ancient Duty to Rescue and 
Modern Attempts to Regulate and Criminalize the Good Samaritan, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1267, 
1268–69, 1274 (2015) (discussing public outcry over the SS California’s alleged refusal to 
render assistance to the capsized Titanic); see also Friedell, supra note 18.  
 21 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ch. V, reg. 33.1 Nov. 1, 1974, 32 
U.S.T. 47 [hereinafter SOLAS Convention]. 
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similarly defined by international instruments governing marine salvage, 
including both the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with 
Respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea (Brussels Convention) and the 
more recent International Convention on Salvage (Salvage Convention).22 
The applicable language of the Salvage Convention reads, “[e]very master is 
bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel and 
persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of being lost at 
sea.”23  
Private shipmasters, of course, do not bear the sole responsibility to 
facilitate maritime search and rescue.  The international legal framework 
instead imposes primary rescue responsibility on state actors.  The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), requires Contracting 
States on the coasts to, “promote the establishment, operation and 
maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service 
regarding safety on and over the sea. . . .”24  The International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) further obliges coastal states 
to establish Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) to monitor distress signals 
and direct rescue responses with ships operating in nearby waters.25  The 
SAR Convention also identifies the broad scope of this obligation by 
requiring that rescuers deliver rescued persons to a “place of safety.”26  In 
fulfilling this duty, the SAR Convention contemplates a cooperative effort 
between RCCs and private vessels.27  In fact, the accompanying Guidelines 
on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea issued in 2004 under the 
auspices of the International Maritime Organization acknowledge that it may 
be the assisting private ship that actually transports survivors to the place of 
safety under the direction of the RCC.28  
                                                                                                                   
 22 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with Respect to Assistance and Salvage 
at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].  Article 11 of the 
Brussels Convention reads, “Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious 
danger to his vessel, her crew and her passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even 
though an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost.” 
 23 International Convention on Salvage art. 10.1, Apr. 28, 1989, 1953 U.N.T.S. 165 
[hereinafter Salvage Convention]. 
 24 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].   
 25 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue ¶¶ 2.3.1–2.3.3, Apr. 27, 1979, 
1403 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter SAR Convention]; Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea ¶ 6.7, May 20, 2004, MSC 78/26/Add.2. 
 26 Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue, 1979, as amended, Res. MSC 155(78) (May 20, 2004).   
 27 Id.  
 28 Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, supra note 25, ¶ 6.18 (“Often the 
assisting ship or another ship may be able to transport the survivors to a place of safety.  
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This interplay between the state responsibility to oversee SAR functions 
and the private obligation to assist is further established through treaty 
provisions addressing shipmaster compliance.  Under UNCLOS, Contracting 
States are obliged to enforce private shipmaster obligations by “requiring” 
the master of ships flying their flag “to render assistance to any person found 
at sea in danger of being lost” and “to proceed with all possible speed to the 
rescue of person in distress, if informed of their need for assistance.”29  The 
Salvage Convention employs similar language mandating that State Parties 
“adopt measures necessary to enforce” the shipmaster’s duty to render 
assistance.30  Domestic legislatures have generally followed suit, producing 
statutes providing for civil and criminal penalties against shipmasters failing 
to respond to requests for assistance.31  
Notably absent from this legal framework is any exception for 
shipmasters operating vessels for commercial purposes.32  These obligations 
are therefore presumed to apply to shipmasters operating private vessels of 
all types, including bulk carriers, container vessels, tankers, fishing vessels, 
and cruise liners alike.  Despite the glaring differences between the physical 
characteristics of these vessels and their feasibility for use in rescue 
operations, the legal obligations placed on the shipmasters operating them at 
sea is fundamentally the same.  
                                                                                                                   
However, if performing this function would be a hardship for the ship, RCCs should attempt 
to arrange use of other reasonable alternatives.”).  
 29 UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 98(1). 
 30 Salvage Convention, supra note 23, art. 10. 
 31 For example, in the United States, 46 U.S.C. § 2304 (2018) provides: 
 (a) (1) A master or individual in charge of a vessel shall render assistance to 
any individual found at sea in danger of being lost, so far as the master or 
individual in charge can do so without serious danger to the master’s or 
individual’s vessel or individuals on board. 
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to a vessel of war or a vessel 
owned by the United States Government appropriated only to a 
public service.  
 (b) A master or individual violating this section shall be fined not more than 
$ 1,000, imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both. 
England, Italy, Greece, Malta, and others have adopted similar legislation.  See, e.g., The 
Merchant Shipping (Distress Messages) Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1691, ¶ 7 (Eng.); Italian 
Code of Navigation 1958, art. 1158; Greek Code of Public Maritime Law art. 227, October 3, 
1973, No. 261; Malta Merchant Shipping Act ch. 234, ¶¶ 305–306.  
 32 Nevertheless, Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, supra note 25, 
¶ 6.3 reads, “A ship should not be subject to undue delay, financial burden or other related 
difficulties after assisting persons at sea; therefore coastal States should relieve the ship as 
soon as practicable.”  
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B.  The Costs of Commercial Vessel Contributions to Large-Scale Rescues 
Using commercial vessels for large-scale rescues is both dangerous and 
remarkably costly.33  Some of the direct costs include humanitarian 
provisions, additional wages and stores, extra fuel consumed during and after 
the rescue, port charges assessed during disembarkation of rescued persons, 
and repairing, restocking, and cleaning the vessel itself.  The indirect costs 
are likely to be even more substantial.  If the vessel deviates from its 
intended voyage, embarks rescued persons, and then proceeds to actually 
transport the rescued persons to a safe port, this is likely to generate 
substantial loss of time and prevent the vessel from fulfilling its scheduled 
commercial activities.  Such delays may impact a variety of actors with an 
economic stake in the underlying voyage, including shipowners, charterers, 
cargo interests, and insurers.  Anecdotally, stakeholders have recently 
reported losses of up to USD $500,000 arising out of a single migrant vessel 
rescue causing the vessel to be delayed for one week.34   
Under the law of salvage, it is possible for a rescuer to recover a reward 
for protecting the property interests of a third party shipowner.  For several 
reasons, however, this salvage framework is unlikely to provide any recourse 
for losses suffered while providing assistance to a migrant vessel.  While the 
Salvage Convention acknowledges life saving to be one factor in 
determining salvage remuneration, life salvage has traditionally been treated 
differently than property salvage.35  In jurisdictions like the United States, 
life salvage is only recoverable from the shipowner if it is made 
contemporaneously with property salvage.36  Pure life salvage, in contrast, 
will not give rise to an independent claim of recovery against the shipowner 
                                                                                                                   
 33 For a more thorough examination the dangers associated with using commercial vessels 
for large-scale rescues, see Richard L. Kilpatrick, Jr. & Adam Smith, The International Legal 
Obligation to Rescue During Mass Migration at Sea: Navigating the Sovereign and 
Commercial Dimensions of a Mediterranean Crisis, 28 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 141, 142–94 (2015). 
See also International Maritime Organization, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees & 
International Chamber of Shipping, Rescue at Sea: A Guide to Principles and Practice As 
Applied to Refugee and Migrants, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/brochure 
s/450037d34/rescue-sea-guide-principles-practice-applied-migrants-refugees.html (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2018).  
 34 See Liam Moloney & Costas Paris, Europe’s Cargo Ships Diverted to Sea Rescues, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boat-people-trying-to-reach-europ 
e-disrupt-mediterranean-mercantile-shipping-1427399702 (noting the extra costs resulting 
from rescues could cause “serious financial problems” for some smaller shipping companies).  
 35 Salvage Convention, supra note 23, art. 13(1)(e) (“[T]he skill and efforts of the salvors in 
salving the vessel, other property and life.” (emphasis added)).  See generally FRANCIS ROSE, 
KENNEDY AND ROSE ON THE LAW OF SALVAGE 124–45 (9th ed. 2017). 
 36 See Martin Davies, Whatever Happened to the Salvage Convention 1989?, 39 J. MAR. L. 
& COM. 463, 498–99 (2008).  
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or rescued persons.37  This doctrine effectively denying compensation for 
saving life, but allowing it for saving property, has long been controversial.38  
While Article 16(1) of the Salvage Convention explicitly provides that 
payment will not be owed from rescued persons, it also appears to allow 
national law to derogate from this principle.39  Nevertheless, even in 
jurisdictions in which pure life salvage creates an independent claim, this 
would not be helpful to the life salvor if the rescued persons are 
impoverished seafarers packed onto worthless inflatable rafts “owned” by 
elusive migrant smuggling cartels.  
An alternative for the rescuer would be to seek reimbursement from a 
fund administered by some external entity, such as a sovereign fund designed 
to cover the costs of saving lives.  Unfortunately, no such fund currently 
exists at the international level.40  Although some statutes like the English 
Merchant Shipping Act of 1995 appear to legislate such options at the 
domestic level, these rely on narrow qualifying circumstances subject to 
political discretion.41  Their efficacy in adequately compensating rescuers is 
also largely untested (and in the context of expensive large-scale rescues, 
unlikely).42  
The unfortunate reality is that the costs of rescues are likely to be 
absorbed by the parties with a pecuniary interest in the underlying 
commercial voyage.  These actors may hedge against some of these risks 
through special insurance products, but standard cargo and hull insurance 
policies are not designed to cover such losses.  Even protection and 
indemnity (P&I) coverage intended to guard against more open-ended 
liabilities would cover only a portion of rescue costs.43  
                                                                                                                   
 37 Id.  
 38 See Freidell, supra note 18 (discussing the history of life salvage under Anglo-American 
law). 
 39 See Salvage Convention, supra note 23, art. 16(1); see also ROSE, supra note 35, at 141 
(noting it is unclear whether national laws could override the general immunity of 
remuneration from saved persons under Article 16).  
 40 Some industry participants have argued that accepting payment for large-scale rescues is 
dangerous because it implies that merchant shipping might be able to serve as a permanent 
solution to large-scale search and rescue.  See David Osler, Shipping Should Reject Migrant 
Compensation, Grimaldi Urges, LLOYD’S LIST (Oct. 16, 2015), https://lloydslist.maritimeintellig 
ence.informa.com/LL020890/Shipping-should-reject-migrant-compensation-Grimaldi-urges.  
 41 The U.K. Merchant Shipping Act 1995 § 224 (1), sch. 11, part II, ¶ 5 grants the Secretary 
of State the discretion to award compensation to a pure life salvor when the rescue involves a 
U.K. registered vessel or occurs in U.K. waters.  
 42 See ROSE, supra note 35, at 144–45 n.400 (noting the discretionary payments for pure 
life salvage available under U.K. law have been “exercised rarely” and involved “modest 
sums” of no more than 250£). 
 43 P&I clubs are mutual self-insurance associations providing broad terms of liability 
coverage. See generally Norman J. Ronneberg, Jr., An Introduction to the Protection & 
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In fact, in the wake of the recent surge in large-scale rescues occurring in 
the Mediterranean Sea, members of the International Group of P&I clubs 
have clarified the scope of their coverage through circulars, newsletters, and 
press releases. These publications have explained that P&I club rules may 
allow recovery of some of the direct rescue-related losses, such as fuel, 
stores, provisions, and port charges, but the indirect losses linked to delays 
will not be covered.44  Consequently, P&I clubs have advised members to 
ensure their commercial contracts reflect the parties’ intentions on rescue 
risk allocation.  In a 2015 loss prevention guidance, the Standard Club 
advised, “it is important that [P&I club] members give careful thought to 
making express and clear provisions within their commercial contracts as to 
who—principally, owner or charterer—will be liable” for the time lost 
during migrant vessel rescues.45  Similarly, the Swedish Club, in a recent 
guidance published on its website, emphasized, “the wording of the 
[charterparty] will decide where the costs for the diversion, as well as other 
costs, will fall.”46  It also urged club members to recognize the substantial 
losses that could be involved in migrant rescues and recommended contracts 
include language, “to minimize the exposure and avoid uncertainty through 
clear wording.”47  
III.  UNCERTAINTY REGARDING WHO BEARS THE RISK OF RESCUE-RELATED 
COSTS 
Determining which commercial actors are responsible for such rescue 
costs can involve untangling complex contractual terms reflected in 
charterparties, bills of lading, policies of insurance, and other documents of 
commercial and legal significance.  Risk allocations defined under the 
governing charterparties are particularly important and serve as the focus of 
this section. 
                                                                                                                   
Indemnity Clubs and the Marine Insurance They Provide, 3 U.S.F MAR. L.J. 1 (1990); W.L. 
Rivers Black III, A P&I Club’s Expectations, and an Admiralty Lawyer’s Approach for 
Responding to Marine Casualty Investigations, 24 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 225 (2011). 
 44 See Refugees at Sea, THE UK P&I CLUB (Apr. 2005), https://www.ukpandi.com/knowledg 
e-publications/industry-issues/industry-developments/refugees-at-sea/; Refugees and Migrants 
Rescued at Sea: Loss Prevention Circular No. 13-09, GARD (Sept. 2009), http://www.gard.no/ 
Content/135829/No%2013-09%20Refugees%20and%20migrants%20rescued%20at%20sea.pdf 
AS.  
 45 Refugees/ Migrants at Sea, THE STANDARD CLUB (July 2005), http://www.standard-club. 
com/media/2533684/people-claims-refugees-migrants-at-sea.pdf. 
 46 Refugees in the Mediterranean, The Swedish Club, https://www.swedishclub.com/loss-pr 
evention/trading-area/refugees-in-the-mediterranean/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).  
 47 Id.  
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Charterparties define the rights, obligations, and liabilities between the 
shipowner and the charterer who, depending on its commercial needs, 
generally contracts either to employ the shipowner’s vessel for a fixed period 
of time or for a particular voyage.48  In the dry trade, the time charterparty is 
the most common type of agreement, in which the shipowner and charterer 
agree to a fixed period for the shipowner and its crew to continue operating 
the vessel while the charterer gives the shipowner orders to fulfill 
commercial responsibilities that the charterer has arranged.49  In exchange 
for the use of the shipowner’s vessel, shipmaster and crew, the charterer is 
obliged to compensate the shipowner through periodic payments of an 
agreed flat-rate fee called “hire” and must cover other expenses such as 
fuel.50  Through this arrangement both the shipowner and the charterer can 
turn a profit as the shipowner and its agents facilitate the vessel’s 
maintenance and navigation while the charterer dictates the vessel’s 
commercial activities.51  Shipowners and charterers are generally free to 
negotiate the specific terms of their agreement under freedom of contract 
principles, yet uniformity in the industry is maintained through the 
widespread use of standard contract forms, such as the NYPE 1946.52  
If the time-chartered vessel deviates from its intended course or is 
otherwise delayed, this lost time may raise legal questions regarding who 
must absorb the financial consequences.  If the delay arises out of a 
shipmaster’s decision to provide assistance to a distressed third-party vessel, 
at least two critical commercial issues arise: first, if the rescue involves a 
deviation from the vessel’s intended course, does this amount to a 
shipowner’s breach of the charterparty?  Second, even if such a deviation 
does not breach the charterparty, must the charterer continue to pay hire and 
other expenses during the period that the vessel is not being used for its 
intended commercial purposes?  Each of these questions are explored below.  
A.  Is Deviation to Rescue Third Parties a Breach of Contract? 
Under a time charterparty, the charterer has the right and responsibility to 
order employment of the vessel.53  To fulfill the shipowner’s obligations, the 
shipmaster must comply with the charterer’s orders and “prosecute his 
                                                                                                                   
 48 See COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 1–12. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 4. 
 51 Id. at 10. 
 52 See HOWARD BENNETT ET AL., CARVER ON CHARTERPARTIES 1–2 (2017) (discussing 
uniformity in charterparties achieved through the use of standard forms and clauses).  
 53 See COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 9, 335. 
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voyage with utmost dispatch.”54  If the shipmaster employs the vessel for 
purposes that are not authorized or otherwise justified, then the charterer may 
have grounds to argue those actions breach the charterparty.55  If the 
shipmaster delays prosecution of the voyage in order to render assistance to a 
distressed vessel, a relevant legal question is whether such a deviation is 
authorized by law or express language in the charterparty. 
In practice, when giving employment orders, a time charterer might not 
give specific instructions regarding the vessel’s route since navigation is 
within the responsibilities of the shipowner (an agreement on the details of 
the voyage route is perhaps more likely in the context of a voyage charter or 
a trip time charter).56  In the time charter context, it is generally understood 
that the shipmaster maintains a degree of autonomy and freedom to diverge 
from the intended course so long as the reasons for the deviation are 
justified, such as to protect the safety of the vessel, crew, and cargo, or 
otherwise fall within the professional expertise of the shipmasters.57  
While there are few published cases directly addressing the question of 
whether deviation for purposes of rendering assistance to a distressed third-
party vessel is justified, the early English case Scaramanga v. Stamp 
discussed this issue in striking terms.58  In that case, the dispute arose during 
a chartered voyage of the Olympias carrying a load of wheat from Cronstadt 
(an island off the coast of today’s St. Petersburg, Russia) to the 
Mediterranean Sea.59  As the Olympias sailed along the North Sea, she 
encountered a vessel called the Arion whose machinery had broken down.60  
The Olympias could have rescued the crew and left the Arion adrift at sea, 
but the shipmaster of the Arion instead negotiated an agreement with the 
shipmaster of the Olympias to tow the disabled Arion to the Netherlands in 
exchange for a salvage payment.61  While en route to the Netherlands with 
the Arion in tow, the Olympias ran aground, and its cargo was lost.62   
                                                                                                                   
 54 Id. at 327.  See also id. at 775, ¶ 8.  
 55 See id. at 327. 
 56 See id. at 331 (discussing the issue of deviation in the context of a time charter, but 
noting that the concept of deviation has developed primarily in relation to bills of lading and 
voyage charters); see also YVONNE BAATZ, MARITIME LAW 149–50 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing 
the applicability of the doctrine of deviation when a time charterer gives express instructions 
on the route); MARTIN DAVIES & ANTHONY DICKEY, SHIPPING LAW 533–36 (4th ed. 2016) 
(discussing what kinds of orders a time charterer may give to the shipmaster). 
 57 DAVIES & DICKEY, supra note 56, at 533–35.  
 58 Scaramanga v. Stamp [1879] 4 CPD 316, aff’d, [1880] 5 CPD 295. 
 59 Scaramanga v. Stamp [1880] 5 CPD 295 at 295. 
 60 Id.  
 61 Id. 
 62 Id.  
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Although the charterparty contained a provision exculpating the 
shipowner from liability for damage to the cargo caused by “perils of the 
seas,” the charterer submitted that the cargo was lost during the property 
salvage attempt, which it argued was a “wrongful deviation.”63  Determining 
who bore the risk of cargo loss hinged on whether the deviation of the 
Olympias was justified.64  If the deviation was justified, then the charterer 
would bear the loss because it had agreed not to hold the shipowner liable for 
cargo loss caused by the traditional perils of the seas.  However, if the 
deviation was unjustified and the cargo was lost during that part of the 
voyage then the shipowner would have been in breach of contract at the time 
of the loss and would therefore be responsible.65  
In making this determination, the English court cogently explained the 
special common law liberty of shipowners to deviate for the purpose of 
saving lives, irrespective of the negative impact on other commercial actors 
with an interest in the underlying shipment.66  The court wrote: 
The impulsive desire to save human life when in peril is one of 
the most beneficial instincts of humanity, and is nowhere more 
salutary in its results than in bringing help to those who, 
exposed to destruction from the fury of winds and waves, 
would perish if left without assistance.  To all who have to trust 
themselves to the sea, it is of the utmost importance that the 
promptings of humanity in this respect should not be checked 
or interfered with by prudential considerations as to injurious 
consequences, which may result to a ship or cargo from the 
rendering of the needed aid.  It would be against the common 
good, and shocking to the sentiments of mankind, that the 
shipowner should be deterred from endeavoring to save life by 
the fear, lest any disaster to ship or cargo, consequent on so 
doing, should fall on himself.  Yet it would be unjust to expect 
that he should be called upon to satisfy the call of humanity at 
his own entire risk. 
 
Moreover, the uniform practice of the mariners of every 
nation—except such as are in the habit of making the 
unfortunate their prey—of succouring others who are in 
danger, is so universal and well known, that there is neither 
                                                                                                                   
 63 Id. at 298.  
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 298–99.  
 66 Id. at 304.  
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injustice nor hardship in treating both the merchant and the 
insurer as making their contracts with the shipowner as subject 
to this exception to the general rule of not deviating from the 
appointed course.  Goods owners and insurers must be taken, at 
all events in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, as 
acquiescing in the universal practice of the maritime world, 
prompted as it is by the inherent instinct of human nature, and 
founded on the common interest of all who are exposed to the 
perils of the seas.67 
Articulating this ancient principle of risk-sharing between shipping 
interests when fellow seafarers in distress face imminent loss of life, the 
court identified an implied liberty for the shipmaster as an agent of the 
shipowner to deviate from the agreed course. 68  
The court framed this common law rule in contrast to deviation to save 
property, noting “[d]eviation for the purpose of saving property stands 
obviously on a totally different footing” and therefore “entails the usual 
consequences of deviation.”69  Applying the rule to the facts before it, the 
court found that while the Olympias had justifiably deviated to render 
assistance to the Arion’s crew, the additional deviation of towing the Arion to 
obtain salvage was unreasonable, and therefore the shipowner (not the 
charterer or its insurer) bore the risk of cargo loss.70 
In addition to this common law rule shielding the shipowner from liability 
arising out of deviation to save life, widely used charterparty forms also 
‘certain circumstances.  These clauses typically contain the liberty to assist 
other vessels.  For example, Clause 16 of the NYPE 1946 form reads in 
relevant part, “[t]he vessel shall have the liberty to sail with or without pilots, 
to tow and to be towed, to assist vessels in distress, and to deviate for the 
purpose of saving life and property.”71  
                                                                                                                   
 67 Id. at 304–05.  
 68 Id.  
 69 Id.  The court wrote: 
Deviation for the purpose of saving life is protected, and involves neither 
forfeiture of insurance nor liability to the goods owner in respect of loss 
which would otherwise be within the exceptions of “perils of the seas.”  And, 
as a necessary consequence of the foregoing, deviation for the purpose of 
communicating with a ship in distress is allowable, inasmuch as the state of 
the vessel in distress may involve danger to life.  On the other hand, deviation 
for the sole purpose of saving property is not thus privileged, but entails all 
the usual consequences of deviation. 
Id. at 304.  
 70 Id. at 306.  
 71 See COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 776, cl. 16. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  3:47 PM 
2018] THE “REFUGEE CLAUSE” FOR COMMERCIAL SHIPPING CONTRACTS 417 
 
Widely recognized international conventions also address the issue of 
deviation as it relates to the rights and liabilities allocated between carriers 
and shippers under a bill of lading.  For instance, the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of 
Lading (Hague Rules) expressly exculpates the carrier for liability arising out 
of life-saving deviations.72  Article IV (4) of the Hague Rules reads: 
Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at 
sea or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be an 
infringement or breach of this Convention or of the contract of 
carriage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or 
damage resulting therefrom.73  
Note that the more recent Hague-Visby Rules, Hamburg Rules, and 
Rotterdam Rules also each contain similar provisions exculpating the carrier 
for losses caused by efforts to save lives at sea.74  
These international agreements were designed to apply to bills of lading 
governing the relationship between carriers and shippers, but they still carry 
relevance in charterparty disputes because charterparty forms regularly 
incorporate these rules (or the domestic equivalents) through a “Clause 
Paramount.”  For example, Clause 24 of the NYPE 1946 form reads, “[t]he 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States . . . shall be deemed to be 
incorporated herein. . . .”75  Note that the referenced Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act (COGSA) is recognized as reflecting the Hague Rules through 
nearly verbatim language.76  
The effect of incorporating the Hague Rules or domestic legislation like 
COGSA into the charterparty is that the rights and liabilities of the shipper 
and carrier described in the rules apply to the charterparty by reading the 
shipowner as the “carrier” and the charterer as the “shipper.”77  Thus, even if 
the charterparty does not include an express provision granting the liberty to 
                                                                                                                   
 72 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of 
Lading (Hague Rules) art. 4, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 LNTS 187, 51 Stat. 533.  
 73 Id. Note that the Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading 1968 (Hague-Visby Rules) art. 4(4), Feb. 23, 
1968, 1412 U.N.T.S. 127, contains nearly verbatim language.  
 74 See United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules) art. 
5(6), Mar. 31, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 89/5, 17 I.L.M. 806; see also United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly By Sea 
(The Rotterdam Rules) art. 17(3)(l), Dec. 11, 2008, A/RES63/112. 
 75 See COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, cl. 24. 
 76 See Senator Linie GMBH & Co. KG v. Sunway Line, Inc., 291 F.3d 145, 158 (2d Cir. 
2002) (discussing the desire of COGSA legislators to maintain the language of the Hague Rules). 
 77 See BENNETT ET AL., supra note 52, at 396.  
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deviate for life saving purposes, by way of a Clause Paramount a shipowner 
may still be able to rely on the liberty to deviate for life-saving rescues. 
Taken as a whole, these common law, contractual, and convention-based 
principles place the shipowner on solid legal footing in situations in which 
the shipmaster has delayed or deviated from the intended voyage to render 
assistance to a third-party distressed vessel.  Applying these principles, it is 
highly unlikely that a charterer could successfully argue the shipowner has 
breached the charterparty by deviating to save life.  However, since 
charterparties are freely negotiated, there is nothing preventing a charterer 
from negotiating charterparty clauses that favorably allocate the financial 
consequences of life-saving deviations as the responsibility of the 
shipowner.78  
B.  Is a Time Chartered Vessel On or Off-Hire During Rescue-Related 
Delays?  
While the shipowner is unlikely to be found in breach of the charterparty 
when the shipmaster deviates to render assistance to other vessels, it is a 
separate question whether the charterer owes the shipowner hire during such 
a deviation.  The default arrangement under a time charterparty is that the 
charterer is obliged to pay hire continuously to the shipowner throughout the 
charter period.79  The charterer’s obligation will be suspended only when 
certain contractually stipulated events place the vessel “off-hire.”  
The off-hire provision contained in Clause 15 of the NYPE 1946 form 
reads in relevant part as follows:  
That in the event of the loss of time from deficiency of men or 
stores, fire, breakdown or damage to hull, machinery or 
equipment, grounding, detention by average accidents to ship 
or cargo, drydocking for purpose of examination or painting 
bottom, or by any other cause preventing the full working of 
the vessel, the payment of hire shall cease for the time thereby 
lost. . . .80 
This clause contemplates enumerated causes “preventing the full working 
of the vessel” in which “payment of hire shall cease” during the lost time.  
These enumerated causes are quite specific, but may broadly be classified as 
                                                                                                                   
 78 See infra Section IV.  
 79 See COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 441.  
 80 Id. at 776, cl. 15. 
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either problems with the vessel itself or arising out of the shipowner’s 
responsibility as the vessel operator.  
The clause also contains a so-called “sweep up” provision recognizing 
“any other cause” to be an off-hire event so long as it “prevents the full 
working of the vessel.”81  The sweep-up provision is typically interpreted 
within the context of the charter as a whole through a principle known as the 
ejusdem generis rule.82  This rule presumes the contract drafters included 
“any other cause” at the end of the list only to capture other similar causes to 
those specifically enumerated in the clause, rather than to serve as an open-
ended catchall provision.83  
Complicating matters, conventional NYPE forms are often amended to 
add the word “whatsoever” to the sweep-up provision, which places the 
vessel off-hire “by any other cause whatsoever preventing the full working of 
the vessel.”84  The amended language precludes the application of the 
ejusdem generis rule and instead suggests any event could trigger the off-hire 
clause if it prevents the vessel from “full working.”85  
Whether loss of time caused by providing assistance to a third-party 
distressed vessel falls within this category of off-hire events remains a 
question of fact and contract construction. In making such determinations, 
the critical issues would be whether the event actually prevents the full 
working of the vessel and, if so, whether the cause is specifically enumerated 
or otherwise captured under the sweep-up provision.  
1.  Cases Addressing the Question of Hire During Rescue-Related Delays 
NYPE forms (along with other widely used charterparty forms) 
customarily include an arbitration clause. Consequently, controversies 
arising under NYPE terms are normally resolved outside of national court 
systems.  This makes published case law analyzing off-hire clauses scarce 
and difficult to track since many industry players prefer to use arbitration to 
ensure confidentiality.  Nevertheless, some relevant arbitration awards have 
been published and others have been reviewed through domestic courts in 
published judgments, which sheds some much- needed light on how off-hire 
clauses might be interpreted in disputes over rescue-related delays.  
                                                                                                                   
 81 Id.  
 82 See id. at 450. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id.  Professor Davies has questioned whether this amendment makes any difference at all. 
See Martin Davies, The Off-Hire Clause in the New York Produce Exchange Time 
Charterparty, 1 LLOYD’S MAR. COM. L.Q. 107 (1990). 
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The most well-known example is Ca Venezolana De Navegacion v. Bank 
Line (Roachbank).86  In that case, the legal issue was whether a time 
chartered vessel was off-hire during a delay flowing from a deviation to 
conduct a large-scale rescue.87  In 1979, while en route from Singapore to 
Taiwan via the South China Sea as part of a larger voyage towards South 
America, the M/V Roachbank encountered a vessel with 293 stranded 
Vietnamese migrants.88  The shipmaster of the Roachbank ordered 
embarkation of the migrants at sea and then proceeded towards the ship’s 
intended destination at Kaosiung, Taiwan.89  After the vessel arrived off of 
the port, the Taiwanese authorities refused to allow the Roachbank to enter 
the harbor until the shipowner agreed to disallow the migrants from 
disembarking and was able to secure a bank guarantee to cover any financial 
losses arising from a breach of that agreement.90  
The migrant rescue and the subsequent reaction of the Taiwanese 
authorities caused the Roachbank to be delayed for nearly nine days.91  This 
delay spawned a legal dispute between the shipowner and the charterer 
regarding whether hire was owed during that period.92  The voyage at issue 
was fixed under the slightly amended NYPE 1946 form containing an off-
hire clause referencing “any other cause whatsoever preventing the full 
working of the vessel” as an off-hire event.93  
The dispute was referred to arbitration, and the majority of the arbitrators 
found that the vessel remained on hire during the rescue and subsequent 
delays.94  The arbitrators’ award itself was not published, but pursuant to 
English procedure, the charterers were given leave to appeal in the English 
Commercial Court.95  On review, the court cited passages from the award 
explaining why the Roachbank remained on hire during the delay even 
though the vessel was prevented from entering port due to the “attitude” of 
the Taiwanese authorities, as well as the stevedores on shore who refused to 
perform cargo work with the migrants still on board.96  
                                                                                                                   
 86 C.A. Venezolana De Navegacion v. Bank Line (Roachbank), [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 498, 
aff’d [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 337 (Eng. C.A.). 
 87 Id. at 499.  
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 500.  
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id.  
 93 Id.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Id.  
 96 Id. at 501.  
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The court recounted the arbitrator majority’s reasoning, noting the 
following findings: while there was a possibility of modest delays while 
migrants were “herded to non-working areas” of the vessel, the “hindrance of 
the number of persons on board” did not “impair ‘the full working of the 
vessel’ as a physical reality.”97  Instead, the Roachbank was “always capable 
as a vessel of performing the service immediately required by the charterers 
and was not prevented by the presence of the refugees from being fully 
worked, had port facilities been made available for them to do so.”98  
The court further addressed the arbitrator majority’s discussion of 
whether the presence of migrants on board the vessel and the unwillingness 
of the Taiwanese authorities to allow access to the port qualified as a “cause” 
under the amended sweep-up provision.99  The court also cited 
counterarguments articulated by the single dissenting arbitrator, who 
presented the view that performing cargo work on the vessel was unlikely 
when it was full of migrants since, “the delays which would be incurred 
would be unacceptable to the charterers who were running a liner service on 
a tight schedule.”100 
Carefully walking through the relevant cases interpreting the NYPE off-
hire clause, the court explained that the proper inquiry was “whether the 
vessel is fully efficient and capable in herself of performing the service 
immediately required by the charterers.”101  Since the arbitrators concluded 
that the vessel remained fully capable of performing such services, the court 
found that it was not necessary for the arbitrators to even consider 
causation.102  On these grounds, the court affirmed the decision of the 
tribunal.103  The charterers subsequently applied for leave to appeal to the 
High Court, but the matter was dismissed on grounds that the lower court 
applied the proper test in analyzing the issue.  Thus, the charterers were 
ultimately responsible for paying hire to the shipowner throughout the 
duration of the delay.104  
A similar question of off-hire clause interpretation in the rescue context 
was addressed in a New York arbitration award published in full form 
                                                                                                                   
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 502.  
 99 Id.  
 100 Id. at 500.  
 101 Id. at 507.  
 102 Id. at 508.  
 103 Id. 
 104 C.A. Venezolana De Navegacion v. Bank Line (Roachbank), [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 337 
(Eng. C.A.). 
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through the Society of Maritime Arbitrators.105  In Osit Shipping, Ltd. v. 
Canpotex Shipping Services, Ltd. (M/V Kitsa), again, the central issue was 
whether a time chartered vessel could properly be placed off-hire during the 
time it deviated from its primary voyage to assist a distressed vessel in which 
loss of life was imminent.106   
In December 1990, the M/V Kitsa was carrying cargo from Vancouver to 
Taiwan when the U.S. Coast Guard requested the M/V Kitsa change course 
to render assistance to the crew of the distressed M/V Elounda Day.107  The 
shipmaster of the M/V Kitsa complied with this request and safely embarked 
the crew of the Elounda Day before it foundered.108  This life-saving 
deviation caused the M/V Kitsa to be delayed for nearly five days.109  As a 
result, the charterer subsequently refused to pay hire to the shipowner for the 
lost time, and in response the shipowner brought a claim in New York 
arbitration alleging the charterer still owed over USD $45,000 in hire and 
bunkers consumed during the deviation.110  
The charterparty at issue was a slightly amended version of the NYPE 
1946 form which contained the original language of several relevant clauses, 
including the unamended Clause 15 addressing off-hire.111  The charterparty 
also obliged the shipmaster to prosecute the voyages with “utmost dispatch” 
but granted the shipmaster the liberty to assist vessels in distress.112  
The parties also included Clause 34, a “rider clause,” which supplemented 
the off-hire provision through the following language: 
Deviation. Should the vessel put back whilst on voyage by 
reason of an accident or breakdown, or in the event of loss of 
time either in port or at sea or deviation upon the course of the 
voyage caused by sickness or accident to the crew or any 
person on board the vessel . . . the hire shall be suspended from 
the time of inefficiency until the vessel is again efficient in the 
same position. . . . All expenses incurred, including bunkers 
consumed during the period of suspended hire, shall be for 
                                                                                                                   
 105 Osit Shipping, Ltd. v. Canpotex Shipping Services, Ltd. (M/V Kitsa), SMA No. 3119, 
1994 WL 16780019 (Fox, Arb. Nov. 2, 1994) [hereinafter M/V Kitsa].  
 106 Id. at *1.  
 107 Id. 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at *1–2.  
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owner’s account and Charterers may deduct such expenses 
from hire payments.113  
Through its written submissions, the shipowner raised several arguments 
focusing on the language of these clauses.114  First, the shipowner argued that 
notwithstanding the shipmaster’s duty to execute the voyage with utmost 
dispatch, the charterparty explicitly granted the shipmaster the liberty to 
deviate from the intended voyage for the purpose of saving life.115  The 
shipowner supported this position by citing the U.S. statute criminalizing a 
shipmaster who refuses to render assistance to other vessels in distress.116 
The shipowner further argued that rescuing “strangers at sea” is not one 
of the specifically enumerated off-hire events in Clause 15.117  Moreover, 
applying the ejusdem generis principle, the shipowner argued, third-party 
rescues should not trigger the sweep-up provision “any other cause” because 
such events are not analogous to the other explicitly enumerated causes.118  
Regarding Clause 34, the shipowner pointed out that it contained no explicit 
language placing the vessel off-hire during a deviation for the purpose of 
assisting third-party vessels and instead, only addressed deviation to assist 
people who were already on board.119  
The charterers, on the other hand, argued that rescuing the crew of the 
Elounda Day qualified as an “other cause” captured under the sweep-up 
language of Clause 15.120  They also argued that the language under Clause 
34 allowing the vessel to be placed off-hire for purposes of deviation caused 
by sickness or accident to “anyone on board the vessel” could be construed 
as including situations in which the vessel deviates to render assistance and 
ultimately embarks rescued persons onto the vessel.121  To support this 
argument, the charterers drew the analogy between saving the lives of 
injured crew members and rescuing third-parties, including “persons on 
another sinking ship, or a downed aircraft, or marooned on an island.”122  
The charterers also raised the argument that the customary and legal 
obligation to assist other vessels in distress is squarely placed on the 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Id. at *2.  
 114 Id. at *2–3.  
 115 Id. at *2.  
 116 Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. § 2304 referenced above in supra note 31). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at *3. 
 119 Id. 
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shipmaster and shipowner.123  Since the charterers are merely buyers and 
sellers of goods, they argued, this legal and moral obligation does not attach 
to them and therefore should not be supported at their expense.124  
The majority of the arbitrators sided with the shipowner and found that 
the vessel remained on-hire throughout the delay.125  First, the majority 
reasoned that Clause 15 enumerates six narrow circumstances in which the 
vessel may be placed off-hire and it does not include any language 
addressing deviations to render assistance to other vessels or to save life.126  
The majority noted that there are a variety of risks associated with the 
voyage left unaddressed by the off-hire clause which are normally absorbed 
by the charterers, including navigation necessary to avoid violent storms or 
pirate attacks.127  
Addressing the argument that a rescue could fall within the sweep-up 
provision assigning “any other cause” as an off-hire event, the majority found 
that rendering assistance to a third-party vessel was distinguishable from the 
other listed causes, each of which “pertain to a cessation or infringement of the 
physical working of the vessel.”128  Finding that “[t]here is obviously nothing 
physically or operationally wrong with the working of a vessel that is able to 
go to the rescue of life or property at sea,” the majority declined to agree with 
the charterer’s “esoteric” interpretation of Clause 15.129  
The majority further reasoned that the liberties clause granted the 
shipmaster the authority to deviate for purposes of assisting distressed 
vessels “without any qualification, condition or reservation for putting the 
vessel off-hire for having done so.”130  Since the charterers failed to 
explicitly exempt themselves from paying hire during such deviations, the 
majority found that “their silence implies that they recognized this 
concession as an inherent exigency of the venture for which they would 
accept the cost. . . .”131  Additionally, since the parties incorporated the U.S. 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act into the charterparty by reference, the majority 
reasoned that this exculpates the vessel for “loss or damage arising or 
resulting from . . . [a]ny deviation in saving or attempting to save life or 
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 128 Id. at *5.  
 129 Id.  
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property at sea.”132  The majority found this combination amounted to a 
“clear cut absolution” for the shipowners.133  
Addressing Clause 34, the majority found that this rider provision was 
only designed to capture deviations relating to the vessel and its crew and not 
for deviation to provide assistance to third-party vessels.134  Thus, even 
though the rescued crew of the Elounda Day were ultimately embarked onto 
the Kitsa, the majority refused to accept the argument that embarkation of the 
rescued persons changed the nature of the deviation to fall within those off-
hire events reflected in Clause 34.135  Instead, the majority found that Clause 
34 was designed to address deviations “resulting from a vessel’s internal 
management or operation” and held that during deviations to rescue third 
parties at sea “hire continues to run.”136  
The sole dissenting arbitrator disagreed and in a separate written appendix 
explained that the vessel should have been placed off-hire for the time lost 
during the deviation.137  The dissenting arbitrator first reasoned that the 
majority misinterpreted the purpose of the liberties clause.138  He explained 
that the liberties clause was designed to delineate between reasonable and 
unreasonable deviations, which carries implications for bill of lading and 
COGSA/ Hague Rules defenses and insurance coverage but does not directly 
allocate risk between the shipowner and the charterer for purposes of hire.139  
Regarding the off-hire provisions contained in Clause 15 and Clause 34, 
the dissenting arbitrator expressed the view that the ejusdem generis rule 
“has little, if any, bearing on the correct interpretation.”140  Instead, he took 
the position that “[i]f the charterer’s use of the vessel is interrupted, 
suspended or delayed by any of the stipulated causes or by ‘any other cause 
preventing the full working of the vessel’ ” then the charterer can properly 
place the vessel off-hire.141  
The dissenting arbitrator further reasoned that the deviation to render 
assistance to the Elounda Day was unlike a deviation to avoid inclement 
weather because it was an “interruption not a prolongation of the vessel’s 
performance in charterer’s service.”142  Since the U.S. Coast Guard ordered 
                                                                                                                   
 132 See U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).  
 133 Id. at *5.  
 134 Id. at *6.  
 135 Id.  
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at Appendix A.   
 138 Id.  
 139 Id.  
 140 Id.  
 141 Id.  
 142 Id. (emphasis added). 
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the shipmaster to render assistance to the Elounda Day, the Kitsa was 
“effectively and legally removed from the charterer’s service and temporarily 
pressed into a rescue effort. . . .”143  
Addressing commercial fairness as a consideration, the dissenting 
arbitrator explained:  
[t]he immediate obligation as well as the long term benefit to 
respond to ships in distress rests with the shipowning 
community.  Although it might sound callous, the interests of a 
time charterer are financial and do not rise to the same moral or 
personal level of the shipowner.  However noble the cause, the 
simple fact remains that the charterer’s service was interrupted 
and it ought not also be required to reward the shipowner for 
complying with its moral or legal obligations to its crew or that 
of a fellow shipowner.  That apple falls at the foot of the 
owner’s not the time charterer’s tree.144 
Finally, the dissenting arbitrator pointed out that it is possible in some 
jurisdictions for the shipowner to seek recovery for life salvage through a 
publicly administered fund and that P&I Clubs may also reimburse the 
shipowner for some expenses.145  Since the owner of the Kitsa made no 
attempt to recover its expenses through those mechanisms, this gave the 
appearance that the shipowner instead sought to “profit from its obligations 
to give aid to the Elounda Day by claiming full hire from its time 
charterer.”146  
A recent case out of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana also addressed the issue of hire during a rescue, albeit 
indirectly.147  The dispute arose after a helicopter experiencing mechanical 
problems during a flight over the Gulf of Mexico was forced to land on the 
deck of the Panamax bulk carrier M/V Aeolian Heritage.148  After the 
landing, the Aeolian Heritage deviated from its “otherwise scheduled path” 
to take the rescued passengers and helicopter to the nearby port in Corpus 
Christi, Texas.149  The shipowner brought an action under the Salvage 
Convention to recover a salvage award from the helicopter owner.150  
                                                                                                                   
 143 Id. 
 144 Id.  
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Sunglory Maritime, Ltd. v. PHI, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 3d 618 (E.D. La. 2016). 
 148 Id. at 626–34. 
 149 Id. at 634. 
 150 Id. at 626–27. 
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The shipowner alleged that the Aeolian Heritage was off-hire during the 
deviation and sought to include loss of hire as part of the salvage award 
calculation.151  Clause 38 of the time charterparty at issue included the 
following language:  
Should the vessel deviate or put back during a voyage, contrary 
to the orders or directions of the Charterers, the hire is to be 
suspended from the time of her deviating or putting back until 
she is again in the same or equidistant position from the 
destination and the voyage resumed therefrom.152  
Interpreting this language without reference to any other clause in the 
charterparty, the court found that the shipowner was correct that the Aeolian 
Heritage was eligible to go off-hire during its deviation to bring the rescued 
persons to port.153  While the court explicitly held that “an event occurred 
that could have triggered Clause 38 and allowed the Vessel to go ‘off-hire,’” 
because the shipowner provided no evidence that the charterer actually 
invoked the off-hire clause and sought a discount for the time that it went 
off-hire, the shipowner could not secure a “double payment” by recovering 
loss of hire as a part of the salvage award.154  
Taken together, the outcomes in the Roachbank and the Kitsa suggest that 
the shipowner is in a strong position under the NYPE form when the 
charterer seeks to place the vessel off-hire during a rescue-related delay.  
However, the divided nature of those arbitration tribunals and the contrary 
finding in the Aeolian Heritage case demonstrate that it is plausible that a 
charterer could succeed in placing the vessel off-hire in certain rescue 
scenarios even if the charterparty is ambiguous on the issue.  To fully 
explore this question, it is useful to turn to other cases addressing off-hire 
issues in the context of third-party intervention.  
                                                                                                                   
 151 Id. at 659.  
 152 Id. at 659–60 (emphasis added).  It is unclear from the court’s opinion or the parties’ 
briefs which time charterparty form was used, but the language cited by the court is similar to 
clause 17 of the NYPE 1993 form, except (perhaps crucially) it omits an internal reference to 
the liberties clause. NYPE clause 17 is discussed infra in Section IV.  See New York Produce 
Exchange Form (1993), in COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 780–91.  
 153 Sunglory Maritime, Ltd. v. PHI, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 3d 618, 660 (E.D. La. 2016).  
Remarkably, the court made this finding without any discussion on whether the vessel was 
prevented from full working or whether the event was a qualifying cause. 
 154 Id.  
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018 3:47 PM 
428  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:403 
 
 
2.  Other Cases Addressing Third-Party Intervention and Off-Hire 
Provisions 
Due at least in part to the widespread preference for confidentially in 
maritime arbitration, decisions like the Roachbank and the Kitsa directly 
addressing the issue of whether the charterer owes hire during rescue-related 
delays have rarely made their way into the public domain.  Nonetheless, 
other cases in the modern era have considered similar questions involving 
delays caused by third parties that were not expressly enumerated under the 
NYPE off-hire clause.155  The English courts in particular have formed a 
somewhat infamous “judicial gloss” addressing some of the most challenging 
issues raised by the interpretation of the NYPE off-hire clause.156 This 
guidance has primarily addressed two fundamental issues: namely, what does 
it mean to prevent the “full working” of the vessel?  And what limits, if any, 
should be applied to the sweep-up provision on causation?  
Courts have examined the question of “full working” by considering 
whether the vessel is “fully efficient” and “fully capable of performing the 
service immediately required of her” by the charterer.157  By applying this 
standard, courts have recognized a distinction between preventing the 
“working” of the vessel and preventing the “use” of the vessel.158  As one 
court put it, even if the vessel is prevented from continuing on the intended 
voyage, the vessel will remain efficient if it is “in every way sound and well 
found.”159  This determination may depend on the physical condition of the 
vessel, but may also be impacted by its qualities, characteristics, history, 
ownership, and other factors affecting the vessel’s legal status.160  In this 
sense, “there is no distinction to be drawn between legal and physical 
incapacity.”161  
Framing the “full working” question in this way regrettably causes 
problems of its own.  There is still some division in the English courts over 
whether it is possible for a barrier imposed by a third party intervention, such 
                                                                                                                   
 155 See generally John Weale, The NYPE Off-Hire Clause and Third Party Intervention: Can 
an Efficient Vessel be Placed Off-Hire?, 33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 133 (2002).  
 156 Id. at 155–57. See also C.A. Venezolana De Navegacion v. Bank Line (Roachbank), 
[1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 498, at 507 (Eng. C.A.) (“[T]he Courts have unquestionably put a 
judicial gloss on the way in which that question of fact is to be put. . . .”). 
 157 Actis Co. Ltd. v. Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd (Aquacharm) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 237 at 
240, aff’d, [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7 (Eng. C.A).  
 158 Mareva Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Canaria Armadora S.A. (Mareva AS) [1977] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 368 (Eng.).  
 159 Court Line Ltd. v. Dant & Russel Inc. (1939) 64 Li.L.Rep. 212 at 219 n.23.  
 160 Belcore Maritime Corp. v. F. Lli. Moretti Cereali S.p.A. (Mastro Giorgis) [1983] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 66 at 69; see also Weale, supra note 155. 
 161 Belcore, supra note 160, at 67.   
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as interference by port authorities, to actually prevent the full working of an 
otherwise efficient ship.162  In making determinations regarding the services 
“required” by the charterer, it is also unclear whether the fact finder should 
apply this test using a subjective or objective standard.163  Employing a 
subjective standard, the charterer’s actual preference for the vessel’s 
immediate services would be given some weight, while an objective standard 
may instead focus on the commercial needs ordinarily required by a time 
charterer under the circumstances.  
The judicial guidance addressing causation is also quite convoluted.  As 
discussed above, the original NYPE language is interpreted narrowly under 
the ejusdem generis principle; however, even the amended sweep-up 
provision modified to broaden the scope of the off-hire clause has caused 
problems, with essentially two diverging views being presented.  One 
approach, as articulated in the Roachbank case, is to view the amended 
sweep-up provision “any other cause whatsoever” as removing any 
limitations on the type of cause that can place the vessel off-hire.164  This 
would make the critical inquiry whether or not the vessel is prevented from 
being fully worked, irrespective of the reason why.  The other approach is to 
view even the amended sweep-up provision as still limited to causes that are 
intrinsic and not “extraneous.”165  Applying this rule, even under the 
amended sweep-up provision, a qualifying cause must relate to the qualities, 
characteristics, history and ownership of the vessel itself.166  
Acknowledging this uncertainty, it is unsurprising that there have been 
diverging results in cases analyzing off-hire issues in which the cause of 
delay was some third-party intervention.  In some of these cases, the 
charterer failed to show that the sweep-up provision allowed the vessel to go 
                                                                                                                   
 162 Andre & Cie S.A. v. Orient Shipping (Rotterdam) B.V. (Laconian Confidence) [1997] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 139 at 141 (Eng.) (noting “this judicial gloss has caused problems in cases where 
the cause of delay is the interference of authorities operating on a vessel which is in herself 
fully efficient”). 
 163 As one commentator has pointed out in reference to the standard “services immediately 
required by the charterer”: 
The problem with the word “required” is that it is ambiguous.  It may convey 
the sense of something that is needed, or it may mean something that is 
demanded.  And that raises the question whether the test articulated by the 
courts is supposed to be strictly objective, or whether there may be embedded 
within it a subjective element of the charterer’s discretion.  
JOHN WEALE, OFF-HIRE: A STUDY 131–32 (Steamship Insure Management Services, 
Ltd., 2016).  
 164 See C.A. Venezolana De Navegacion v. Bank Line (Roachbank), [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
498, 500 (Eng. C.A.). 
 165 Mastro Giorgis, [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 69. 
 166 Id. 
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off-hire.  For instance, in the Aquacharm case, the charterer was unable to 
place the vessel off-hire through the unamended NYPE language after the 
Panama Canal Authority demanded cargo be offloaded to lighten the vessel 
before allowing it to transit through the Panama Canal.167  Likewise, the 
charterer in the Laconian Confidence case was unable to place the vessel off-
hire when the vessel was delayed for over two weeks while port authorities 
determined a bureaucratic procedure for discharging cargo residue from the 
previous shipment.168  
In at least two other cases, however, the charterer was able to successfully 
place the vessel off-hire by invoking the amended sweep-up provision to 
capture causes that were not otherwise enumerated.  In the Apollo, the vessel 
was found to be off-hire during the time it was denied port entry because 
local authorities suspected that members of the crew on board had contracted 
typhus.169  Likewise, in the Mastro Giorgis case, the vessel was found to be 
off-hire when cargo owners placed an arrest on the vessel after cargo on 
board was damaged, which prevented the vessel from being allowed to 
depart the port.170  
More recently, in the wake of a surge in maritime piracy around the Horn 
of Africa, two cases made their way on appeal through the English 
Commercial Court involving the question of whether a vessel is off-hire 
during lost time caused by a pirate seizure.  In COSCO Bulk Carrier Co., 
Ltd. v. Team-Up Owning Co. Ltd., a Panamax bulk carrier called the 
Saldanha was attacked by Somali pirates while traveling through the transit 
corridor in the Gulf of Aden.171  The vessel was taken to the waters off the 
coast of Somalia and remained under the pirates’ control for a period of two 
and a half months during the spring of 2009.172  The vessel had a hire rate of 
over USD $52,000 per day and upon release of the vessel after a ransom was 
paid, the charterers refused to pay any hire for the period the vessel was 
controlled by the pirates.173  
The Saldanha was fixed under the NYPE 1946 form, containing the 
original Clause 15 off-hire language.174  The charterers made three arguments 
under this language.  First, the charterers argued that the detention by the 
                                                                                                                   
 167 Aquacharm, [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 237, 240 (Eng. C.A). 
 168 Andre & Cie S.A. v. Orient Shipping Rotterdam B.V. (Laconian Confidence) [1997] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 139. 
 169 Sidermar S.p.A v. Apollo Corp. (Apollo) [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 200 at 200, 205.  
 170 Mastro Giorgis, [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 66.  
 171 COSCO Bulk Carrier Co., Ltd. v. Team-Up Owning Co. Ltd (Saldanha) [2010] EWHC 
1340 (Comm), [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 187, 187.  
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 173 Id. at 189. 
 174 Id.  
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  3:47 PM 
2018] THE “REFUGEE CLAUSE” FOR COMMERCIAL SHIPPING CONTRACTS 431 
 
pirates amounted to “[d]etention by average accidents to ship or cargo.”175  
Second, they argued that negligent errors in navigation amounted to 
“[d]efault and/or deficiency of men.”176  Finally, they argued that the seizure 
by the pirates was an “other cause” captured by the original sweep-up 
provision.177  While the arbitrators did find the vessel was prevented from 
“full working,” the charterers were unable to show that pirate detention was a 
qualifying cause.178  
On appeal, the English Commercial Court affirmed the arbitration award 
and held that charterers had not met the burden of showing the pirate attack 
was an event that brought the vessel under the off-hire clause.179  The court 
affirmed the finding because no physical damage was caused to the vessel 
and the pirate attack was not akin to other forms of “average accidents to 
ship or cargo” that typically occur in the shipping industry.180  The court also 
affirmed the holding that “default and/or deficiency of men” was only 
intended to capture situations in which the crew refused to perform duties, 
rather than any negligent performance of those duties.181  
The court also upheld the finding that a pirate seizure could not be 
designated as “any other cause.”182  The charterers had submitted that the 
sweep-up provision would encapsulate piracy-related delays if interpreted 
within the context of its overriding purpose to prevent disputes based on 
“nice distinctions.”183  The court, however, pointed out that the sweep-up 
provision at issue did not include the amendment “whatsoever” and therefore 
could not be used to capture extraneous events different than those 
enumerated because the ejusdem generis rule applied.184  Holding that a 
pirate attack is a “classic example” of an event falling outside the scope of 
the sweep-up provision because it is “totally extraneous,” the court affirmed 
the arbitrators’ decision that the vessel remained on-hire throughout the 
pirate detention.185  
Critically, the court in the Saldanha case also made the practical point 
that if parties wish to include piracy as an off-hire event, they should do so 
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 176 Id. at 191.  
 177 Id. at 192.  
 178 Id. at 188.  
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the vessel had been prevented from “full working.” Id. at 188. 
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 182 Id. at 192–94. 
 183 Id. at 193.  
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plainly and in clear terms through unambiguous language.186  The court 
wrote, “[s]hould parties be minded to treat seizures by pirates as an off-hire 
event under a time charterparty, they can do so straightforwardly and most 
obviously by way of an express provision. . . .”187  
While the Saldanha case was recognized as an important case “crossing 
the threshold from the private realm of arbitration into a public judgment at 
first instance,”188 another similar case made its way to the court only two 
years later.  In Osmium Shipping Corporation v. Cargill International SA 
(Captain Stefanos), again the dispute concerned the issue of whether a time 
chartered vessel was on or off-hire during a period in which it was controlled 
by pirates.189  
The Panamax bulk carrier, the Captain Stefanos, was carrying coal from 
South Africa to Italy when it was attacked by pirates in the Indian Ocean as it 
headed towards the Suez Canal.190  The vessel was detained for more than 
two months, and after its release, a dispute arose between the shipowners and 
the charterers about whether hire was owed during the pirate seizure.191  
Like in Saldanha, there was apparently no dispute that the presence of the 
pirates on board prevented the full working of the vessel.  However, the legal 
issue was slightly different because the Captain Stefanos charterparty 
included a rider clause, which added substance to the original off-hire 
clause.192  The relevant portion of the rider clause read as follows:  
Should the vessel put back whilst on voyage by reason of any 
accident or breakdown, or in the event of loss of time either in 
port or at sea or deviation upon the course of the voyage caused 
by . . . capture/ seizure, or detention or threatened detention by 
any authority including arrest, the hire shall be suspended from 
the time of the inefficiency until the vessel is again efficient in 
the same or equidistant position in Charterers’ option, and 
voyage resumed therefrom.193 
The arbitrators found that this rider clause was specific enough to allow 
the charterers to bring the events within the clause and therefore suspend hire 
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during the time the vessel was detained by pirates.194  On appeal, the English 
Commercial Court affirmed the award, reasoning that the arbitrators had 
reached this conclusion by properly considering the language of the clause 
and its grammar, syntax, and punctuation.  Since the off-hire clause dealt 
specifically with capture, seizure and detention, the charterers met their 
burden in showing the circumstances amounted to an off-hire event.195  Thus, 
although the Saldanha and Captain Stefanos cases were similar on the facts, 
the revised off-hire language used in the latter case produced a contrasting 
result.  
While the cases discussed here do not directly speak to the issue of 
rescue-related delays, they bring to the surface the interpretation problems 
that courts and arbitrators encounter when similarly applying NYPE off-hire 
language to facts involving outside intervention.  The “full working” 
standard articulated by these cases is remarkably high, and a charterer may 
find it difficult to establish that a rescue operation or related delay does in 
fact prevent the vessel from being “fully capable of performing the service 
immediately required.”196  Surprisingly, however, in both the Saldanha and 
Captain Stefanos cases, there was no dispute that the vessel had been 
prevented from full working, which suggests that the curiously strict 
“judicial gloss” on the issue may not be a total barrier to a charterer’s 
argument.  But even if “full working” is interpreted more liberally, these 
cases still demonstrate that express language is the preferred way to expand 
off-hire scenarios rather than relying on the inconsistently interpreted sweep 
up language “any other cause” or “any other cause whatsoever.”  While 
specific decisions about how to modify the off-hire clause would be left to 
negotiations subject to the bargaining positions of the parties, as is 
demonstrated by the diverging results in the Saldanha and Captain Stefanos 
cases, it is these minor changes that can make all the difference.  
IV.  ALLOCATION OF RESCUE COSTS THROUGH REVISED CHARTERPARTY 
TERMS 
The above discussion demonstrates that it is in the best interest of parties 
with an economic stake in a maritime venture to ensure the costs of rescue 
operations are clearly allocated.  Particularly when the voyage involves 
transit through waters subject to a period of mass maritime migration, such 
as is occurring at present in the Mediterranean Sea, it is prudent for 
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 196 See Actis Co. Ltd. v. Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd. (Aquacharm), [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
237, 240; 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7 (Eng. C.A). 
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commercial shipping contracts to reflect the enhanced likelihood of disputes 
over rescue-related costs.  Unfortunately, the standard boilerplate language 
contained in the most widely used time charterparty forms is inadequate to 
resolve such issues.  Consequently, it may be necessary for parties to adopt 
more precise and explicit language when allocating rescue-related costs.  
Determining what language to include and whether it is feasible for 
modifications of this kind to be widely adopted are separate questions that 
warrant further exploration below. 
A.  Drafting an Effective “Refugee Clause”  
Rather than leaving courts and arbitrators to determine who bears rescue-
related costs by applying contract language that is silent or ambiguous on the 
issue, those with a commercial interest in the voyage should ensure 
charterparties contain language that specifically addresses these questions of 
liability.  Naturally, however, shipowners and charterers would approach the 
negotiation of such clauses from adverse perspectives.  For any direct costs 
arising out of rescue operations, including additional fuel, supplies, food, and 
wages, both the shipowner and the charterer would want to shift such costs 
onto the other party by express contract language.  The indirect costs, such as 
loss of hire during periods of delay, would be more complicated.  
One approach to drafting a shipowner-friendly provision would be to 
grant the shipmaster the liberty to deviate for rescue-related activities 
through a standard liberties clause and then expressly exclude such 
deviations as an off-hire event.  Under its original Clause 16 language, the 
NYPE 1946 form grants the shipmaster the liberty to deviate to assist other 
vessels and save lives, but the clause is silent on whether such a deviation 
has implications for hire.197  While the shipowner successfully convinced the 
arbitrators that the vessel should remain on hire in both the Roachbank and 
Kitsa cases discussed above, this would not necessarily be the result in every 
case in interpreting the NYPE 1946 form, particularly if the presence of 
rescued persons prevents the vessel from safe operation.  
A more explicit approach to handling the hire implications of the liberty 
to deviate is employed by the new NYPE 2015 form jointly authored by 
BIMCO, the Association of Shipbrokers and Agents, and the Singapore 
Maritime Foundation.198  The NYPE 2015 form includes a liberties clause 
that is unchanged from the 1946 version reading, “[t]he Vessel shall have the 
liberty to sail with or without pilots, to tow and be towed, to assist vessels in 
                                                                                                                   
 197 See COGHLIN ET AL, supra note 15, at 776.  
 198 See BIMCO, ASBA & SMF, supra note 16, at 3.  
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distress, and to deviate for the purpose of saving life and property.”199  
Referencing the liberties clause, the separate off-hire clause reads in relevant 
part: 
Should the Vessel deviate or put back during a voyage, 
contrary to the orders or directions of the Charterers, for any 
reason other than accident to the cargo or where permitted in 
Clause 22 (Liberties) hereunder, the hire to be suspended from 
the time of her deviating or putting back until she is again in 
the same or equidistant position from the destination and the 
voyage resumed therefrom.200 
By tying together the liberties clause with the off-hire clause by reference, 
this NYPE 2015 language protects the shipowner by excluding life-saving 
deviations as off-hire events.  While a better approach for the shipowner may 
be for the charterparty to expressly read that the vessel “shall remain on hire 
during any deviation permitted in the Liberties Clause,” the NYPE 2015 
language is nevertheless more complete and explicit on this issue than the 
popular but nebulous NYPE 1946 form.  
The NYPE 2015 language, however, would not be acceptable to a 
charterer who enjoys a strong bargaining position and is concerned about 
rescue-related costs.  A more charterer-friendly clause would therefore 
involve a different approach.  Since a shipmaster is legally bound to assist 
vessels in distress, a charterer could not enforce a provision unconscionably 
preventing the shipmaster from rendering such assistance.201  However, the 
charterer could still negotiate contractual language protecting its financial 
interests in a rescue scenario.202  To do so, the charterer could continue to 
                                                                                                                   
 199 Id. at 16, cl. 22.  
 200 Id. at 15, cl. 17 (emphasis added).  Note that Clause 22 of the NYPE 1993 form uses 
similar language referencing the lines of the liberties clause (lines 257 to 258) within the off-
hire clause:  
Should the Vessel deviate or put back during a voyage, contrary to the orders 
or directions of the Charterers, for any reason other than accident to the 
cargo or where permitted in [lines 257 to 258] hereunder, the hire is to be 
suspended from the time of her deviating or putting back until she is again in 
the same or equidistant position from the destination and the voyage resumed 
therefrom. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also COGHLIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 780–91.  
 201 See infra Section III.  
 202 See Martin Davies, Obligations and Implications for Ships Encountering Persons in 
Need of Assistance at Sea, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 109, 137 (2003) (“[I]t is quite possible 
for a charterer to bargain that the presence of refugees puts the ship off-hire if that is what it 
wants, although it may have to pay a little more by way of hire in return.”); see, e.g., Whistler 
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grant the shipmaster the liberty to deviate to render assistance, but 
simultaneously make such deviations subject to an obligation of the 
shipowner to absorb the associated costs.  This may be accomplished by 
placing language in the liberty to deviate clause expressly indemnifying the 
charterer for the costs of additional bunkers and others liabilities arising out 
of assistance to other vessels.  Regarding the critical issue of hire, the 
charterer could include rescue-related deviations as an explicit off-hire event, 
similar to the charterer’s approach on piracy in the Captain Stefanos case.  In 
doing so, the charterer might also tie this language together with the liberties 
clause to clarify that the two clauses are not in conflict.  
For example, a charterer-friendly off-hire clause might read:  
Should the vessel put back whilst on voyage in the event of 
loss of time either in port or at sea or deviation upon the course 
of the voyage caused by rendering assistance to other vessels 
and delivering rescued persons to a place of safety, including 
any deviations permitted in the Liberties Clause hereunder, the 
hire shall be suspended from the time of the inefficiency until 
the vessel is again efficient in the same or equidistant position 
in Charterers’ option and voyage resumed therefrom.  
For the charterer, this approach would be much preferred to strained 
arguments relying on problematic sweep-up provisions like the ones which 
proved ineffective for the charterers in both the Roachbank and the Kitsa 
cases.203 
                                                                                                                   
Int’l Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. (Hill Harmony), [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 147147 (HL) 
for a clause referencing the presences of “refugees” as an off-hire event:   
55. In the event of loss of time [either in port or at sea, deviation from the 
course of the voyage or putting back whilst on voyage,] caused by [sickness 
of or an accident to or misconduct by Master/Officers/crew, or refugees or 
any person on board the vessel other than persons travelling by request of 
Charterers or by] reason of the refusal of Master or Officers or crew to 
perform their duties [or of an accident or breakdown to vessel or drydocking,] 
the hire shall be suspended [from the time of inefficiency in port or at sea, 
deviation or putting back until vessel is again in the same position or 
equidistant position from the destination, and voyage resumed therefrom, 
and] direct expenses incurred including bunkers consumed during such 
period of suspension shall be for Owners’ account.  
Id. 
 203 Professor Davies has offered the following alternative to the problematic sweep-up 
provision: “In the event of the loss of time from any cause depriving the charterer of the 
immediate and effective disposition of the ship, the payment of hire and overtime, if any, shall 
cease for the time thereby lost.” See Davies, supra note 85, at 112.  
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Due to the competing interests between the shipowner and charterer, a 
compromise involving cost sharing would be the most equitable solution 
(although the bargaining position of the parties and market conditions are 
likely to be the most influential factors in determining what language is 
ultimately used).  With this concept of compromise in mind, at least one 
insurer has put forth a model clause designed to achieve a 50/50 split 
between shipowners and charterers of certain rescue-related costs. The UK 
Defence Club, in its 2015 publication “Deviation to Save Life at Sea” 
proposed the following “draft refugee clause”: 
In the event of the ship deviating for the purpose of saving 
human life (other than crew members / the owners’ personnel), 
or for the purpose of participating in search & rescue 
operations (as instructed by the ship’s flag administration or 
coastal state authorities), all costs, liabilities and expenses 
excluding the payment of hire and bunkers consumed shall be 
split 50/50 between the owners and the charterers [in the event 
that they are irrecoverable from the relevant authorities].  The 
phrase ‘all costs liabilities and expenses’ shall, for the purpose 
of this clause, include: 
a) All telecommunication costs, crew bonuses and 
overtime and port costs including anchorage, pilot, tug 
and other costs incurred; 
b) All water, food, stores, fuel and equipment consumed 
or used to rescue, care for and disembark the refugees; 
c) All stores and equipment consumed or used and 
related costs (such as garbage disposal or third party 
cleaning costs) or any repairs to the ship to return the 
ship to the same condition she was in before the 
deviation; and 
d) All liabilities to third parties, including liabilities for 
injuries suffered by the ship’s Master, crew or third 
parties, except where the liability is caused by the 
negligence of the Master or crew or a failure to exercise 
due diligence to maintain or make the ship seaworthy.204 
The above clause could reduce some of the uncertainty regarding who 
bears rescue-related losses by promoting cost sharing for many of the 
                                                                                                                   
 204 Deviation to Save Life at Sea, UK DEF. CLUB 1, 3 (July 2015), https://www.ukdefence. 
com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-defence/Photos/Publications/Soundings/UKDC-Soundings-June-20 
15-Deviation-save-life-vW.pdf. 
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associated liabilities.  The clause equitably distributes a variety of “costs, 
liabilities and expenses” between the shipowner and charterer, expressly 
addressing some of the more substantial risks such as fuel consumed during 
rescue, repairs to the vessel, and personal injury arising out of rescue 
operations.  
Significantly, however, the clause contains explicit language “excluding 
the payment of hire and bunkers consumed” from the 50/50 split.205  As a 
result, the question of hire cannot be answered by the clause itself and would 
therefore be governed by a separate off-hire clause.  For shipowners and 
charterers attempting to achieve a true 50/50 split of rescue costs, the parties 
should omit this exclusion and instead explicitly address hire.  Without 
addressing such issues, costly disputes may still arise.  
Another potentially problematic feature of the UK Defence Club clause is 
that it does not comprehensively address the scope of the shipmaster’s 
obligation to coordinate in ensuring rescued persons are delivered to a place 
of safety.  While the clause does apply the 50/50 split to deviation “for the 
purpose of participating in search & rescue operations (as instructed by the 
ship’s flag administration or coastal state authorities)”206 it is unclear whether 
logistical delays linked to determining an appropriate place of 
disembarkation are within the scope of costs contemplated by the clause.  
This is particularly important because, as demonstrated by the reaction of the 
coastal authorities in the Roachbank case, substantial delays may result from 
resistance to migrant disembarkation.207  Since the SAR Convention requires 
shipmasters to coordinate with state RCCs to deliver rescued persons to a 
place of safety a commercial vessel could face substantial delays if a place of 
disembarkation cannot be determined quickly.208  
It is also important to recognize that the most effective “refugee clause” 
will not mention the word “refugee” at all.  “Refugee” is a term of art with a 
technical legal meaning under international humanitarian law, which could 
ultimately impact how the clause would be interpreted.  The UK Defence Club 
clause reads, “ ‘all costs, liabilities and expenses’ shall, . . . include . . . [a]ll 
water, food, stores, fuel and equipment consumed or used to rescue, care for 
and disembark the refugees . . . .”209  This language may lend itself to technical 
                                                                                                                   
 205 Id.  
 206 Id.  
 207 The infamous M/V Tampa incident off the coast of Australia is perhaps the most high 
profile example of a commercial delay directly caused by the attitude of coastal authorities 
after a migrant rescue.  For a discussion of commercial implications arising out of that 
incident, see Davies, supra note 202. 
 208 SAR Convention, supra note 25, ¶ 1.3.2.  
 209 See Deviation to Save Life at Sea, supra note 204.  
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arguments dependent on whether the rescued persons can successfully 
demonstrate their status as individuals entitled to refugee protection.  
Designation of refugee status generally requires an investigation by state 
immigration officials concerned with whether the individual can establish a 
well-founded fear of persecution in the state of origin, as required under 
treaties such as the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.210  Since contemporary maritime migration tends to be characterized 
by “mixed” populations that include both refugees and economic migrants 
who may not be able to establish refugee status, such technicalities could limit 
the effect of contract clauses using this language.211  A better clause would use 
the phrase “rescued persons” rather than “refugees.”212 
While parties are free to draft language to distribute rescue-related costs 
however they see fit under freedom of contract principles, it would be of 
substantial commercial value for industry organizations to develop model 
clauses for easy adoption by shipowners and charterers.  There is in fact wide 
precedence for this as organizations such as BIMCO, Intertanko, and others 
have historically endorsed a number of new charterparty clauses for different 
purposes, some of which relate to migration issues.  For example, BIMCO 
has published multiple iterations of a “Stowaways Clause” designed to 
allocate responsibility between shipowners and charterers for fines, delays, 
and other costs of disembarking stowaways who gain access to the vessel 
without authorization.213  This precedent highlights the question of whether it 
is now appropriate and feasible for a model refugee/rescue clause to be 
recommended by industry organizations to more explicitly address large-
scale rescue costs, particularly addressing the contentious issues of deviation 
and hire discussed above.  
B.  Model Charterparty Clauses Arising out of Contemporary Maritime 
Challenges: Piracy as a Lesson 
Wholesale modifications to widely used charterparty forms have occurred 
periodically to better reflect contemporary commercial practices (NYPE has 
been revised six times), yet the shipping industry has generally been resistant 
                                                                                                                   
 210 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 3, Jul. 28, 1951, 1954 U.N.T.S. 152. 
 211 See Marina Sharpe, Mixed Up: International Law and the Meaning(s) of “Mixed 
Migration,” 37 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 116, 120 (2018).  
 212 An equivalent clause capturing the nature of the current maritime migration patterns 
might instead employ the following language: “ ‘all costs liabilities and expenses’ 
shall, . . . include . . . [a]ll water, food, stores, fuel and equipment consumed or used to rescue, 
care for and disembark any rescued persons.” 
 213 BIMCO, Special Circular No. 1, Stowaways Clause for Time Charter Parties 2009 (Jan. 
2010) (on file with author). 
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to the adoption of these comprehensive revisions.214  Despite this reluctance 
to change, the industry response to the modern maritime piracy problems 
provides insight into the feasibility of rapid contract modifications to meet 
pressing maritime challenges.  As discussed above, pirate attacks targeting 
commercial vessels began occurring with alarming regularity in the Gulf of 
Aden between 2008 and 2012.215  At its peak in 2010, commercial vessels 
were attacked on an almost daily basis, terrorizing professional seafarers and 
also creating substantial economic losses across the shipping industry.216  
As hijacked vessels were often detained for months on end while ransom 
payments were negotiated, the resulting economic losses created commercial 
disputes, such as the Saldanha and the Captain Stefanos cases discussed 
above in Section III.217  Prior to this piracy crisis, most time charterparties, 
including those using the NYPE 1946 form, were silent on many of the 
relevant legal issues.  These included whether the vessel is off-hire during 
the time the vessel is attacked or seized by pirates, whether the master has 
the liberty to choose an alternative route to avoid areas at risk for piracy, who 
is responsible to pay for additional security on the vessel, and how other 
liabilities should be apportioned, such as personal injury to the crew, marine 
pollution, wreck removal, and premiums for kidnap and ransom insurance. 
Recognizing this problem, in 2009 BIMCO and other industry 
organizations began publishing model clauses for time charterparties that 
specifically address piracy-related liabilities.218  BIMCO in particular 
initially drafted its piracy clause with the express objective “to consolidate 
into a single provision the contractual position of the parties in relation to the 
threat of piracy.”219  After publication of the first iteration of the piracy 
clause, some industry participants claimed the language was too favorable to 
shipowners.220  Fearing that a one-sided clause would not be widely adopted 
in practice, BIMCO put together a working group to carefully consider the 
various positions of industry stakeholders who were invited to contribute 
with comments.221  The result was a revised piracy clause addressing a 
variety of related risks by more equitably splitting some of the most 
                                                                                                                   
 214 See Todd, supra note 10.  
 215 Jonathan Bellish et al., The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2012, Oceans Beyond 
Piracy (2013), http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/View%20Full%2 
0Report_3.pdf.  
 216 Id.  
 217 See infra Section III.  
 218 BIMCO, Special Circular No. 2, BIMCO Piracy Clause for Time Charter Parties 2009 
(Nov. 2009) (on file with author).  
 219 Id. at 1.  
 220 Id. at 1–2.  
 221 Id. at 2–4.  
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significant liabilities between shipowners and charterers.222  Again, in 2013, 
BIMCO revised its piracy clause “to ensure that the provisions remain in line 
with commercial requirements.”223  
The current iteration, the BIMCO Piracy Clause for Time Charter Parties 
2013, includes provisions addressing a number of piracy-related liabilities.224  
These include granting the master the liberty to take appropriate precautions 
when navigating through an area exposed to a high risk of piracy and 
assigning charterers with the obligation to pay any additional insurance 
premium imposed by the shipowner’s insurers as a result of the vessel 
navigating in an area of enhanced risk.225  On the contentious issue of 
whether the vessel would remain on hire during a pirate attack or seizure, the 
clause contains the following language: 
(e) If the Vessel is attacked by pirates any time lost shall be for 
the account of the Charterers and the Vessel shall remain on 
hire. 
(f) If the Vessel is seized by pirates the Owners shall keep the 
Charterers closely informed of the efforts made to have the 
Vessel released.  The Vessel shall remain on hire throughout 
the seizure and the Charterers’ obligations shall remain 
unaffected, except that hire payments shall cease as of the 
ninety-first (91st) day after the seizure until release.226  
This language prevents a piracy attack or seizure from being construed as 
an off-hire event but effectively caps the payment of hire at ninety days from 
the time the vessel is initially seized.  While the language still appears to 
favor shipowners by making the charterer initially liable for hire during 
piracy-related delays, BIMCO has taken the position that this ninety day cap 
on hire “represents a sharing of the risk” between charterers and 
shipowners.227  A more cynical view is that the ninety-day cap simply 
reflects the average time period that a vessel is held by pirates, which would 
in effect make the charterer liable for hire during the whole of most pirate 
seizures.228  Nevertheless, BIMCO has explained that the cap is designed 
                                                                                                                   
 222 Id.  
 223 BIMCO, Special Circular No. 7, Revised Piracy Clauses, BIMCO (July 19, 2009) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Revised Piracy Clauses]. 
 224 Id.  
 225 Id. at 2.  
 226 Id. at 4.  
 227 Id. at 2.  
 228 See G. Hunter, BIMCO Piracy Clauses, 15 J. INT’L MAR. L. 291, 292 (2009).  
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only to be “a starting point and parties are free to negotiate a figure which 
meets their specific needs.”229  
It is unclear how widespread BIMCO piracy clauses have been adopted in 
practice.  However, the 2013 iteration was incorporated into BIMCO’s most 
recent comprehensive charterparty revision, the NYPE 2015 form.  It is too 
early to measure whether NYPE 2015 will become an industrial standard 
rivaling NYPE 1946.  Observers have submitted that the new form is more 
likely to become fodder for contractual “cherry-picking” than wholesale 
adoption by industry participants.230  Although adoption of the full revised 
form may be preferred for the sake of contract continuity, which may relieve 
courts and arbitrators of the headaches induced by sloppy amendments to 
existing forms, including bespoke or cherry-picked language within the 
charterparty that directly addresses the risks of contemporary maritime 
challenges, it is better than simply remaining silent on these issues.  
Regardless of how widespread these clauses have been adopted, the 
industry response to the maritime piracy crisis by quickly developing new 
charterparty language offers insight into the feasibility of rapid contract 
modification reacting to new developments.  This sense of urgency exhibited 
in response to piracy suggests there is hope for mobilizing a similar reaction 
to the current search and rescue crisis in the Mediterranean Sea by updating 
inadequate charterparty language. 
In drawing any analogies between piracy and search and rescue for 
purposes of drafting contract language, it must first be acknowledged that 
there are some fundamental differences in the way commercial actors are 
impacted by these two separate crises.  In practice, delays created by a pirate 
hijacking are likely to be longer in duration than delays caused by a rescue 
operation (although this would, of course, depend on the specific situation).  
Furthermore, in a pirate hijacking scenario, it may be easier to sympathize 
with the shipowner whose vessel and crew are subjected to an enhanced risk 
of physical danger at least in part because the charterer presumably directed 
the master to proceed to a destination requiring navigation through unsafe 
waters.  Thus, to some degree, it is sensible to contractually assign the 
charterer the responsibility to indemnify the shipowner for piracy-related 
liabilities, including the obligation to pay hire for at least part of the duration 
of a vessel seizure.  This is perhaps why the BIMCO piracy clauses, despite 
undergoing multiple revisions, still overwhelmingly favor the shipowner’s 
position.  
                                                                                                                   
 229 Revised Piracy Clauses, supra note 223, at 2.   
 230 See Todd, supra note 10, at 318–19.  
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In the rescue context, however, it is not so easy to sympathize with the 
position of the shipowner at the expense of the charterer. International law 
ultimately places the obligation to rescue squarely on the shipmaster, who, in 
the charterparty context, is the agent of the shipowner, not the charterer.  
Consequently, when the shipmaster deviates from the contractual route to 
render aid to a distressed vessel in compliance with international legal 
obligations, this is no fault of the charterer.231  As was convincingly pointed 
out by the dissenting arbitrator in the M/V Kitsa case, the legal obligation to 
render assistance to distressed vessels fundamentally rests with the 
shipowning community, and it would therefore be a peculiar result for the 
charterer to “reward” the shipowner for the shipmaster’s compliance with 
humanitarian duties.232  While shipowners and charterers are of course free to 
negotiate the terms of charterparties in a way that places the financial burden 
of rescues on the charterer, considering the equities is a reasonable starting 
point for such negotiations.  
Even acknowledging the differences between the piracy and rescue 
contexts, some charterparty revisions addressed in the BIMCO piracy clauses 
can still serve as a model for drafting a useful rescue clause.  Provisions 
resolving uncertainty over liability for deviation, hire, bunkers, insurance, 
and others are fundamental in both contexts. By recognizing the likelihood of 
disputes involving these particular issues at the outset of commercial 
voyages and by amending the charterparty language to answer relevant 
questions of liability, industry stakeholders can certainly learn from the 
piracy crisis to mobilize a similarly urgent response to contract revisions in 
the search and rescue context.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
As of this writing in the final months of 2017, the Mediterranean Sea is 
still very much in the throes of a search and rescue crisis.233  The year 2016 
was the deadliest on record for migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, and the 
tragic trend of mass drownings has continued in 2017.234  Reportedly, 
however, the heavy rescue burden initially placed on commercial vessels in 
2014–2015 has diminished slightly due to enhanced search and rescue 
initiatives conducted by state coast guards, regional security forces, and 
                                                                                                                   
 
 232 See M/V Kitsa, supra note 105.  
 233 See IOM, Mediterranean Update, supra note 1.  
 234 Id.  
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volunteer humanitarian organizations.235  Yet the sustainability of these 
alternatives remains questionable.  
Recent news out of Italy in particular suggests coastal authorities may 
become less receptive to disembarkation of rescued persons at its ports.236  
Such resistance could prolong delays as rescuing vessels seek to deliver 
rescued persons to a place of safety in accordance with obligations arising 
under the SAR Convention.237  The role of volunteer humanitarian 
organizations conducting rescues in the Mediterranean is also being 
scrutinized, calling into question the stability of their contributions.238  In 
summer of 2017, several of these organizations, including Médecins Sans 
Frontières, which had deployed specialized rescue vessels in the 
Mediterranean Sea in recent years, suspended operations due to increasingly 
dangerous interactions with the Libyan coast guard.239  These are worrying 
developments for the shipping industry, signaling the burden and scope of 
commercial vessel demands for rescue operations could again increase in the 
near future.  Commercial stakeholders must therefore continue to prepare for 
the seemingly inevitable calls for contributions in the Mediterranean Sea 
(and perhaps elsewhere).240 
                                                                                                                   
 235 See Mediterranean Migrant Crisis, supra note 1. 
 236 See Europe Migrant Crisis: Italy Threatens to Close Ports as Ministers Meet, BBC (July 
2, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40470102; James Politi, Italy Threatens to 
Block Foreign Boats with Migrants from Ports, FIN. TIMES (June 28, 2017) (“If Italy follows 
through on its threat, it could affect the work of several non-governmental organisations and 
non-Italian merchant vessels performing rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea.”).  
 237 See SAR Convention, supra note 25, §§ 1.3.2, 2.1.9.  
 238 Italy Impounds NGO Rescue Ship and Sends Navy Patrol Boat to Libya, THE GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/02/italy-impounds-ngo-rescue-sh 
ip-sends-navy-patrol-boat-to-libya-migrant-refugee-route-europe; Italy Seizes NGO Rescue Boat 
for Allegedly Aiding Illegal Migration, STRAITS TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.straitstimes. 
com/world/europe/italy-seizes-ngo-rescue-boat-for-allegedly-aiding-illegal-migration; Anna 
Momigliano, Aid Groups Say Italy is Forcing Them to Stop Rescuing Migrants at Sea, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/15/aid-gr 
oups-say-italy-is-forcing-them-to-stop-rescuing-migrants-at-sea/?utm_term=.0740536502d0.  
 239 See Gavin Jones, More NGOs Follow MSF in Suspending Mediterranean Migrant Rescues, 
REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-ngo-idUSKCN1 
AT0IZ; Jon Henley & Angela Giuffrida, Three NGOs Halt Mediterranean Migrant Rescues 
After Libyan Hostility, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/20 
17/aug/14/three-ngos-halt-mediterranean-migrant-rescues-after-libyan-hostility; Yannis 
Behrakis, Spanish Migrant Rescue Ship Threatened by Libyan Coastguard: Witness, REUTERS 
(Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-ngo/spanish-migrant- 
rescue-ship-threatened-by-libyan-coastguard-witness-idUSKCN1AV20Q. 
 240 Deadly trends in mass maritime migration have also continued in Asia and even Latin 
America raising concerns about SAR capacity in those regions.  See, South-east Asia: Mixed 
Maritime Movements, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) (June 2015), http://www. 
refworld.org/docid/55e6c1994.html; see also Nicholas Casey, Hungry Venezuelans Flee in Boats 
to Escape Economic Collapse, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/ 
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While the recent crisis has highlighted the important role of private ships 
in supporting global SAR functions, industry stakeholders are correct in 
asserting that the legal framework imposing affirmative rescue duties on 
commercial shipmasters was not designed to deal with a problem of the 
present scale.241  In fulfilling its role in the context of frequent large-scale 
rescues, commercial shipmasters and crews take on incredible risks and 
shipping interests incur substantial financial losses.  Since no functioning 
mechanism exists to reimburse these expenses, it is the shipping interests and 
their insurers who absorb rescue costs pursuant to their commercial 
arrangements.  
The NYPE 1946 charterparty form, despite its flaws, continues to serve as 
an industry standard with perceived reliability.  Unfortunately, the problems 
explored above demonstrate how even trusted forms may be largely 
inadequate in allocating rescue costs.  By recognizing the deficiency of 
standard clauses, shipping interests should consider contract modifications 
that more specifically and predictably allocate rescue costs.  Such changes, 
however, require an awareness of the very real losses that can arise out of 
rescue operations and an understanding that these risks are important enough 
to diverge from long-trusted boilerplate contract language.  
Some stakeholders have encouraged contracting parties to include rider 
clauses rectifying this problem but few have offered any specific guidance.  
It would therefore be of significant assistance for industry organizations, 
such as BIMCO or others, to consider publishing model clauses to support 
commercial players in developing language to more adequately allocate 
rescue costs.  The success of employing model clauses to allocate risks in 
other contexts, including rapidly emerging problems such as piracy, 
demonstrate the feasibility for contracts to be quickly amended in response to 
dynamic maritime challenges.  
Drafting model clauses is of course a formidable challenge in itself and 
should involve careful deliberation with industry participants.  As 
demonstrated by the result in the Roachbank and Kitsa cases, despite the 
ambiguity of standard forms, the status quo is more likely (although not 
certainly) to favor the shipowner position.242  Consequently, it may be 
charterers who must push for favorable contract modifications.  
                                                                                                                   
25/world/americas/hungry-venezuelans-flee-in-boats-to-escape-economic-collapse.html?mcubz 
=0.  
 241 Mediterranean Migrant Crisis, supra note 1 (“[W]hile shipping companies will always 
meet their humanitarian and legal responsibilities to come to the rescue of anyone in distress 
at sea, the obligations contained in the IMO SOLAS and SAR Conventions were never 
intended to address this unprecedented situation.”). 
 242  See infra Section III.  
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018 3:47 PM 
446  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:403 
 
 
Nevertheless, both shipowners and charterers would benefit from clear and 
predictable language precisely allocating rescue risk.  Leaving such issues to 
be governed by the void of contractual silence will likely lead to costly 
disputes.  
Rescue costs, exotic as they seem, are just another type of risk that those 
involved in maritime voyages have always had to anticipate.  While uniquely 
springing from humanitarian roots, rescue-related delays are not so different 
than those caused by chancing upon inclement weather, pirates, or incidents 
of war.  During periods of mass migration at sea, when the likelihood of 
expensive rescues is enhanced, contracting parties should recognize this risk 
as they do others, by seriously evaluating potential losses and negotiating 
terms containing clear allocations of liability.  In developing such language, 
these negotiations carry implications beyond risk sharing or business 
pragmatism—they reflect noble efforts to commercially facilitate an ancient 
custom motivated by the impulse to preserve human life at whatever the cost. 
